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some in his pocket, the jury again must decide if this explanation
is plausible enough, under the circumstances, to rebut the presumption. An important element shedding light upon X's intent
is the manner in which he concealed the merchandise. If he placed
the goods in his pocket or in the bottom of a shopping bag, this
would seem to indicate that the requisite intent to shoplift was
present. If he placed the goods in a more revealing position, the
jury might well find that his explanation dissolves the presumption of intent. Thus, the controlling elements appear to be the
manner in which the goods are concealed and at what location in
the store the accused is accosted.
While the West Virginia statute aids the state in its prosecution
by employing a presumption of intent, the North Carolina statute
seems to be the better of the two, in that it eliminates the intent
element altogether. Viewing the ultimate goal to be attained, that
of affording the merchant a practical remedy for his protection,
the North Carolina statute more nearly satisfies this need. Although some injustice may result in North Carolina because one
with a plausible explanation may still be found guilty, an equal
injustice may result in West Virginia. Where one who is guilty
is acquitted because the jury felt that the accused had successfully
rebutted the presumption of intent, he may then bring an action
against the merchant for false arrest, false imprisonment, or malicious prosecution. The law must treat all citizens equally, and the
housewife who picks up a fifty cent item is equally as guilty as a
professional shoplifter who takes hundreds of dollars worth of
merchandise. Our shoplifting statute is a step forward toward
modernizing the law to keep pace with the modernized world of
today.
David Mayer Katz
Labor Law-J-urisdiction of NLRB-Dolar Yardsticks of
NLRB and the "Affecting Commerce" Test
The National Labor Relations Board assumed jurisdiction of a
labor dispute where the evidence showed that Employer, a New
York corporation, sold within the state more than 500,000 dollars
worth of fuel oil products purchased in the state from a refinery
engaged in interstate commerce. The Board found Employer had
engaged in unfair labor practices and petitioned the United States
Circuit Court of Appeals for enforcement of an appropriate cease
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and desist order. Held, remanded to the Board with instructions
to take further evidence to determine the manner in which the
labor dispute affects interstate commerce. NLRB v. Reliance Fuel
Oil Corp., 297 F.2d 94 (2d Cir. 1961).
The problem in the instant case involves the application of the
"dollar yardsticks" which the Board applies to determine if a particular labor dispute will have a sufficient impact on interstate
commerce to warrant its attention.
Congress in enacting the National Labor Relations Act 29 U.S.C.
§§ 151-68 (1958), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 401 (Supp. II, 1961),
made it applicable to labor disputes "affecting commerce" and thus
exercised its power to regulate commerce to the fullest extent possible. Polish National Alliance v. NLRB, 322 U.S. 643 (1944); Cf.
Guss v. Utah Labor Board, 353 U.S. 1 (1956); NLRB v. Fainblatt,
306 U.S. 601 (1939). Even activities intrastate in nature are subject
to control if they have a close and substantial relation to interstate
commerce. NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1
(1936).
It was recognized early that the Board did not have the facilities
and resources to extend effectively its jurisdiction to the limits of
the commerce power. The Board found it necessary to withdraw
the boundaries of its jurisdiction in order to concentrate on disputes which had a substantial affect on interstate commerce. For
fifteen years jurisdiction was circumscribed on a case-by-case basis
until the Board found it more effective to establish published minimum jurisdictional requirements rather than rely on the time consuming and confusing case method. These minimum standards were
revised from time to time and proved effective in reducing the
amount of energy and money expended on determining jurisdictional questions. In 1956, the Supreme Court rules in Guss
v. Utah Labor Board, supra, that the state could not act where
the Board refused jurisdiction and urged revised standards to fill
the "no man's land" thus created. In 1958 the Board publicly announced the adoption of new jurisdictional standards. Press Release (R-576). The revised standards were subsequently formally
published in a series of cases. See Siemons Mailing Service, 122
N.L.R.B. 81 (1958), for the history of the NLRB "jurisdictional
yardsticks."
The NLRB was amended in 1959 to give state and territorial
courts authority to assert jurisdiction in the "no man's land" where
the Board declined to act and to freeze the minimum jurisdictional
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limits at 1959 standards. The Board may extend its jurisdiction,
but may not further restrict it, and may, by rule of decision or published rule, decline jurisdiction over any class or category of
employers where it feels that exercise of its jurisdiction is not
warranted. National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 164 (1958),
as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 164 (Supp. II, 1961).
The court in the principal case states that the NLRB "appears to
assume" that a dispute involving any employer whose business
exceeds the jurisdictional minimum of 500,000 dollars and who
purchases material within the state which originated outside the
state necessarily affects commerce within the meaning of NLRA.
Recent case decisions of the NLRB show that the Board clearly
recognizes that the test of jurisdiction does not depend on business
volume alone. There must be a clear indication that the employer's busijiess activities affect commerce. In the NLRB report of
the principal case, the intermediate report of the trial examiner
indicates that jurisdiction depends on the existence of 'legal jurisdiction" and gross volume of business. Reliance Fuel Oil Corp.,
129 N.L.R.B. 1166 (1961). The question was put squarely before
the Board in International Longshoremen's Union, 124 N.L.R.B.
813 (1959), where it was argued that any case-by-case appraisal
of the term "affecting commerce" had been rejected by the Board
in Siemons Mailing Service, supra, and subsequent cases explaining the new jurisdictional standards. This proposition was refused
by the Board, which explained that the gross dollar volume test,
standing alone, was insufficient to confer jurisdiction on the
Board, some proof of legal jurisdiction being necessary. See also
NLRB v. Pease Oil Co., 279 F.2d 135 (2d Cir. 1960), where the
Board's term "jurisdictional standard" is termed a misnomer.
The jurisdictional yardsticks considered alone could serve as a
sharp dividing line to identify businesses "affecting commerce."
It is highly improbable that an enterprise meeting the gross dollar
standards would not affect interstate commerce. International
Longshoremen's Union, supra. Time and energy expended by the
Board in deciding jurisdictional issues could be directed toward
ruling on the merits of the disputes. Parties to labor disputes would
know to which forum, state or federal, to apply for relief and
would not run the risk of expending time and money carrying a
case through several trial stages to discover they were in the wrong
court.
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Such an arbitrary definition of "affecting commerce," however,
would destroy the distinction between interstate commerce and
commerce affecting the internal affairs of a state. "That distinction between what is national and what is local in the activities of
commerce is vital to the maintenance of our federal system."
NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., supra. Numerous decisions indicate that the courts would not accept the criteria of
volume of sales alone as adequate evidence that a business activity
affected commerce. NLRB v. Fainblatt, supra; NLRB v. Drummond, 21 F.2d 828 (6th Cir. 1954). The proper criterion for determining jurisdiction is the impact of local action on interstate
commerce which must be determined as a matter of fact on a
case-by-case basis. NLRB v. Benevento, 297 F.2d 873 (1st Cir.
1961).
The decisions in the instant case and in NLRB v. Benevento,
supra, make it clear that the Board must present strong evidence
of the affect of local business activity on interstate commerce to
support a finding of fact that it has jurisdiction over a local business, or its rulings will not be enforced by the Federal Courts.
Herbert Stephenson Boreman, Jr.

Labor Law-Mandatory Requirements of Bargaining
Union submitted to employer a contract including a proposal
that the employer execute a performance bond. Employer assented to all terms except the performance bond and an impasse
was reached on this issue. The union struck, and the employer
charged the union with an unfair labor practice in proceedings
before the NLRB. The NLRB found that the union's insistence
upon a performance bond amounted to a refusal to bargain in
good faith, National Labor Relations Act § 8(b) (3), 29 U.S.C.
§ 158(b) (3) (1952), and ordered the union to cease and desist.
Held: enforcement granted. A performance bond is not within the
scope of mandatory bargaining under the National Labor Relations Act § 8(b) (3), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b) (3) (1952). Refusal
to come to an agreement over a condition which is not within the
scope of mandatory bargaining is a refusal to bargain collectively
in good faith which is an unfair labor practice. Local 164, Brotherhood of Painters v. NLRB, 293 F.2d 133 (D.C. Cir. 1961).
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